ABSTRACT
Feathers hit the ground before their weight can leave the air.
R.E.M.

I. Introduction
Do the incomes or productivity levels of different economies have a tendency to converge? Numerous researchers have recently examined this question by calculating cross-section regressions of measured growth rates on initial levels. See for instance Barro (1991) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) , Baumol (1986) , DeLong (1988) , Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) , Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , and many others. Such regressions have, in fact, become known as " Barro regressions," and are widely used to analyze empirical growth dynamics. Evidently, in a Barro regression, a negative coefficient on initial levels is taken to indicate convergence.
This paper clarifies what such initial level regressions are able to uncover. As used in this literature, the term convergence can mean a number of different things:
(a) Countries originally richer than average are more likely to turn below average eventually, and vice versa-the cycle repeats; (b) Whether a country income is eventually above or below average is independent of that economy's original position; (c) Income disparities between countries have neither unit roots nor deterministic time trends; and (d) Each country eventually becomes as rich as all the others-the cross-section dispersion diminishes over time.
Cases (a) and (b) vaguely correspond to the notions of mixing and ergodicity in econometrics (see e.g. White (1984) ). Case (c) is one formulation of persistence in income disparities: from a time-series perspective, it is the natural way to examine dependence on initial conditions. This particular probability model raises interesting econometric issues in the context of unit root random fields (see Quah (1992a) ); it is, however, quite different in spirit and in substance from initial level regressions. Case (d) is closest to the notion of poorer countries eventually catching up with richer countries.
If (a) and (b) are the cases of interest, then models for studying transitional characteristics-for example, that used in the income distribution and earnings mobility literature-would seem appropriate. Thus, Quah (1992b) attempts to uncover such effects in the context of heterogeneous Markov chains. Overall, however, the work using initial levels regressions strongly suggests case (d) as being of interest.
This paper first shows, in Section 2, that the widely-used initial level regressions described above, in fact, shed no light on convergence in the sense of (d). It does this by developing an analogy between such regressions and Francis Galton's classical fallacy of regression towards the mean.
1 Recall that Galton, in aristocratic manner, was concerned about the sons of tall fathers regressing into a pool of mediocrity along with the sons of everyone else-he inferred this from observing that taller-than-average fathers had sons who turned out to be not as much above average as the fathers themselves. He could not, however, reconcile this with the population of male heights continuing to display significant cross-section dispersion. I show-using exactly the same reasoning which resolves that paradox-that a negative cross-section regression coefficient on initial levels is, in fact, perfectly consistent with the absence of convergence in the sense of (d). Barro (1991) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) , and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) have recently shown that what they call "conditional convergence" occurs. Some of these authors further claim that this conditional convergence happens at approximately the same rate over different time periods and across different crosssectional samples. The results described in the previous paragraph extend-in a straightforward way-to cover these cases of conditional convergence: simply apply the argument to the residuals of output growth, after conditioning on exogenous variables of interest. While Galton's formulation is convenient for analyzing observations at two points in time, it offers little by way of interesting dynamics. Extending the analysis to permit such dynamics, I show, again in Section 2, that a given cross-section distribution-replicating itself over time-is consistent with arbitrary signs on the cross-section initial levels regression coefficient. In other words, the sign of the initial levels regression coefficient says nothing about whether there is convergence or divergence.
Section 3 describes an alternative, more direct means for examining the convergence hypothesis, using a model of a cross-country distribution of incomes, evolving dynamically. The results here show that while one can uncover pockets of convergence, the data overall show divergence instead. The picture that emerges is one of a world where countries tend-in the long run-towards either the very rich or very poor, with the middle income classes disappearing. The disparity between the rich and poor, further, appears to be widening. Finally, Section 4 briefly concludes.
II. Galton's Fallacy Dynamics
I will argue here that calculating a cross-section regression to explain time-averaged growth rates gives an example of why it is inappropriate to attempt to draw dynamic implications from cross-section evidence. The earliest example of this that I know is the famous Galton's fallacy of regression towards the mean. In this section I make that connection explicit.
Consider Figure 2 .1: such a graph is certainly not original with the current paper. It is arguably one of the original motivations for the entire endogenous growth literature, and has appeared in publications ranging from Paul Romer's academic papers to magazines like The Economist. Figure 2 .1 shows a wide dispersion of average growth rates for economies having low initial income levels. (The data source and a listing of the different economies studied here are given in the Data Appendix.) There is little sign of a negative correlation-in the cross-section-between initial conditions and timeaveraged growth rates. But why might one expect such a negative correlation?
Suppose that after controlling for appropriate exogenous differences-human capital, government policy, natural resources-different economies are hypothesized to have the same long-run income level, or, alternatively, the same growth path. Then in a picture like Figure 2 .1-again, after controlling for exogenous variables-should not there be a negative correlation in the cross section, so that countries initially starting lower catch up with or converge to those countries already ahead? Controlling for exogenous differences might be as simple as just looking at Figure 2 .1, but using the residuals from some first-stage regression.
An alternative representation of this convergence idea is given in Figure 2 .2: Such a graph shows a collapsing of the cross-section distribution-possibly after controlling for exogenous variables-about an underlying growth path that happens to be unique across countries. It seems intuitive that this dynamic characteristic should manifest in a negative correlation of time-averaged growth rates with initial conditions (such as Figure 2 .1 ought to show).
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That such a negative correlation does not, in fact, imply a collapsing of the cross-section distribution is easily seen from the reasoning in Galton's fallacy. (I repeat: the argument here applies whether one takes just the raw data or the residuals from a first stage regression, i.e., controls for exogenous conditioning. Thus, the distinction between conditional and unconditional convergence is irrelevant here.) Suppose, contrary to Figure 2 .2, that the cross-section distribution is not collapsing, but replicates itself because it happens to be the stationary distribution for many independent and identically-distributed country incomes Y j (t). For t 1 and t 2 arbitrary points in time, the cross-section regression of Y (t 2 ) on a constant and Y (t 1 ) is just:
where
) , the C subscript denoting cross-section. The assumption that the cross-sections are in stationary state gives:
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
then implies that λ ≤ 1, so that:
with the coefficient on Y (t 1 ) necessarily nonpositive. If t 1 < t 2 then ( †) is a regression of (scaled) growth rates on an initial condition: the conclusion above then implies that the coefficient on the initial condition is always no greater than zero, even when the cross-section distribution remains invariant over time. A negative sign on the initial-condition coefficient, therefore, does not indicate a collapsing cross-section distribution. This, of course, is simply Galton's fallacy of regression towards the mean.
As formulated here, the argument takes the extreme assumption that the cross-section distribution is invariant. This makes the point particularly clear, but there is no real need for that time invariance. The coefficient in this initialconditions regression depends only on λ, or equivalently, the relation between Cov C (Y (t 2 ), Y (t 1 )) and Var C (Y (t 2 )) and Var C (Y (t 1 )). Therefore, the "initialcondition coefficient" can be negative-λ strictly less than 1-even if Var C (Y (t 2 )) exceeds Var C (Y (t 1 ))-the cross-section distribution can diverge even when the initial conditions regression shows a negative correlation between time-averaged growth rates and initial levels! Further, nothing in the argument relies on t 2 exceeding t 1 : all the same (negative) conclusions follow, even when the researcher is estimating a "final-condition" (or orrab) regression or a "middle-condition" regression. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that the message in Figure 2 .1 is unchanged by replacing the initial conditions with income levels at other arbitrary dates. This kind of cross-section regression is thus completely uninformative for the dynamics of the distribution.
Galton's Fallacy reasoning, in discussing the empirics of growth, is sometimes phrased as follows: a negative initial condition provides a force for the crosssection distribution to collapse; on the other hand, ongoing disturbances provide a force in the opposite direction.
3 This phrasing is, however, specious. To see why, consider starting out the cross-section distribution with all countries at the same point. Then, over time, the distribution must tend towards its stationary version. Provided that the countries are not perfectly correlated, there must be a divergence from the initial distribution. All this happens with neither a change in the underlying time-series representation for each country, nor a change in the covariance properties across countries. Thus, any regression calculated from data on these countries must remain unchanged, independent of whether the crosssection is collapsing or diverging. If regression ( †) is perturbed so that the initial condition appearing on the right is not that used to calculate the average growth rate on the left-hand side, then we have:
where:
These different forces underly Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) 's distinction between β-and σ-convergence.
All the same observations made earlier about λ now apply equally to ν: the sign of λ − ν depends on Cov C (Y (t 0 ), Y (t 1 )) and Cov C (Y (t 2 ), Y (t 1 )) in addition to the variances of Y (t 2 ), Y (t 1 ), and Y (t 0 ). No sensible inference can thus be drawn on the dynamics of the cross-section distribution by the cross-section regressions that are typically estimated. In particular, perturbing the initial condition gives no more information on the convergence properties of the distributions over time.
The strong independence and identical distribution assumption I used above plays a role only in simplifying the calculations. With heterogeneity, any timeinvariant cross-section distribution is a probability mixture of the different individual time series ergodic distributions. Weak forms of dependence across countries will not affect their cross-section distribution being approached by the empirical (really just a version of the Glivenko-Cantelli law). With strong dependence or small numbers of countries, the empirical cross-section distribution is a nondegenerate random element in the space of distributions. While the calculations then become much more difficult, the flavor of the results is unaffected.
It is useful, therefore, to eschew this kind of analysis, and seek a better way to model the dynamics of this large cross-section. Figure 2 .5 shows a threedimensional plot of the natural logarithm of per capita country incomes, arrayed in both time and cross-sectional unit: this graphs the raw data behind the calculations previously undertaken in Figures 2.1, 2 .3, and 2.4. While the ordering of these data along the time axis is obvious-time proceeds naturally sequentiallythat along the country axis is not. Here, I have arbitrarily taken the ordering given in World Bank country codes-reported in, among other places, Summers and Heston (1991) . This graph shows the complications for dynamic inference-are countries converging over time? diverging? growing in a way depending on size?-off of this data set. The variation in the data is as rich in the cross-section dimension as it is in the time-series. Growth rate regressions, averaging out the time dimension, are simply one-and it turns out, misleading-way to analyze such a data structure. Standard econometric methods are not well-suited to working with such data structures.
III. Direct Tests of Convergence
An alternative, more transparent way to see whether convergence occurs is to examine directly the cross-section distributions of output per worker over time. Because the entire world might be growing, and because the analysis is most naturally performed abstracting from this world-wide comovement, I calculated output per worker for each country, divided by the same figure for the world. (Thus, a number like 2 below indicates twice the world average, and so on.) This normalization is an easy-but imperfect-way to abstract from world-wide growth and fluctuations; a more accurate, but also more difficult, normalization can be obtained using methods in Quah and Sargent (1993) . The key message from this sequence of graphs is that the cross-section distributions do not appear to be collapsing. Instead, they seem to be fluctuating over time. Filling in the gaps from 1963-1973 and 1975-1984 with additional graphs of the densities for each of those years would simply reinforce that idea.
Two natural questions arise here: First, recall expositions of the neoclassical growth model, as e.g. in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) . Those make clear that a nondegenerate distribution as in these graphs could well be consistent with that growth model in steady state-see in particular equation (6) of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and the surrounding discussion. Those models, however, cannot produce a diverging distribution over time.
5 An informative examination of this prediction therefore should examine the behavior of the cross-section distribution in steady state. But which of Figures 3.1 (a) - (d) is steady state? Second, confronted with the representations of the data in Figures 3.1 (a)-(d) , a researcher is tempted to ask if the "bump" in the density between 2 and 4 in 1985 contains the same countries as that in 1974. Graphs such as these cannot tell us that.
Both questions can be answered, however, by developing a probability model of transitions-law of motion-for the distributions in Figures 3.1 (a)-(d) that can, at the same time, be used to generate a characterization of the steady state. Quah (1993b) provides exactly such a model: he uses discrete Markov chains to approximate and estimate a law of motion for the evolving distributions. While that work has not yet been able to give any measures of precision, the results suggest two interesting empirical characteristics: (1) the ergodic distribution of these cross-country incomes is one where many countries are rich and many are poor, with the middle-income countries a vanishing class; and (2) intra-distribution mobility is nontrivial-over sufficiently long periods of time, output per worker wanders outside of any fixed neighborhood. These results appear at odds with the predictions of the standard neoclassical growth model, as described in e.g. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) .
But those conclusions on the ergodic distribution bear an important qualification: they are conditional on the arbitrary grid that was used to discretize the point-in-time empirical distributions. From Markov chain theory, we know that a continuous first-order Markov process (otherwise well-behaved) need not even retain the Markov property when inappropriately discretized. More directly, in a discrete setting, statements to the effect that probability mass piles up in a certain part of the distribution have to be related to the choice of the discretizing grid. It of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil into unobservable country-specific processes. Quah (1993a) is a study in the same spirit as the current one, but explicitly considers conditioning information. A brief discussion of the results there will appear below.
is important, therefore, to check the robustness of those conclusions.
In the current work, I explore a different representation for the dynamics in the evolving distributions of Figure 3 .1. Fix a set of increasing, nonredundant probabilities P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }. For income distribution F t in each period t, the set P determines a corresponding set of quantiles Q(t) = {q 1 (t), q 2 (t), . . . , q n (t)}, where, by definition, the quantiles and probabilities are related by p k = F t (q k (t)), for k = 1, . . . , n. When P is chosen to be equally spaced on the open unit interval (0, 1), each quantile-set pair { Q(t), Q(t + 1) } defines an (n + 1) × (n + 1) fractile transition probability matrix M (t) of transitions from F(t) to F(t + 1). (The terminology fractile Markov chain is from Geweke, Marshall, and Zarkin (1986) ; it is natural also to call fractile the transition probability matrix of such a Markov chain.) Notice that given probabilities P , the fractile matrix M (t) is uniquely determined even if the quantiles Q are not. If the fractile matrix M is assumed to be time-invariant, then it can be estimated by averaging across both time and countries. Further, if the quantile sets Q(t) happen to be time-invariant then the representation here collapses to a version of that used by Quah (1993b) .
In the subsequent analysis, I impose time-invariance in M , but leave { Q(t) : integer t } as a serially correlated vector process. Therefore, the work here generalizes that in Quah (1993b) , and serves as a check on the robustness of conclusions there. The dynamic evolution of the sequence of income distributions can be obtained by first forecasting Q, and then taking the convolution with M raised to the appropriate power. Because M is a fractile matrix, we immediately know that there is an ergodic distribution, and further that that ergodic distribution is uniform relative to the quantiles Q (implied by P ). The corresponding ergodic distribution on the original state space is then found by combining the preceding fact with knowledge of the sequence of quantile sets { Q(t) : integer t }. In words, the transition matrix M parametrizes intradistribution mobility, while the vector sequence Q parametrizes movements in the entire distribution.
I have estimated four-and five-state fractile Markov chain models for the cross-country income distributions, again taken relative to world average.
6 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give the corresponding transition probabilities M . The first feature that strikes one is the extreme immobility over time apparent in these transition probabilities. The very richest remain so with probability at least 98%; the very poorest, with probability at least 95%. The interior diagonal entries in both tables are lower than the extreme diagonal endpoints: middle-income economies are less likely to remain where they are in the distribution. From the tables, we see that those middle-income economies face about equal probabilities of rising or falling. Notice that as estimated, both M 's imply that the corresponding fractile Markov chains are irreducible and have all states ergodic. Thus, the long run, steady state distributions are unique, and by the previous discussion, are also uniform (relative to Q).
To complete the description of these transition dynamics, we now consider the behavior of the quantile sets { Q(t) : integer t }. Over the estimation period 1962-1984, these varied in quite suggestive ways. With n = 4, the median q 2 wandered between 0.61 in 1962 (half the world's economies had per capita incomes no greater than 61% of the world average) to 0.70 in 1975, and then 0.65 in 1984 . During this period, q 2 never rose above 0.76 (1978) nor fell below 0.60 (1964) . By contrast, the 0.25 quantile q 1 drifted downwards from an average of 0.36 over 1962-4 to 0.27 over 1982-4; the 0.75 quantile q 3 upwards from 1.29 to 1.50. Similar behavior (naturally) manifests with n = 5: the 0.2 quantile q 1 drifted downwards from an average of 0.31 over 1962-4 to 0.23 over 1982-4; the 0.8 quantile q 4 upwards from 1.57 to 2.04. In words, the median roughly stays put while the upper quantiles wander upwards, and the lower quantiles downwards. These movements at the extremes are, for the most part, monotone from year to year over 1962-84: the preceding description of time averages at the beginning and end points of the sample are thus representative of general tendencies.
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Putting together these observations on the dynamics of Q and the immobility patterns in M , we come to much the same conclusions as Quah (1993b) . The crosscountry income distributions evolve over time in a way that shows a tendency for the rich remaining rich and the poor, poor, and for the gap between rich and poor to widen. I do not present the calculations here, but it should be clear from the structure of the transition probabilities in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 that iterating those transition probabilities shows the same effects as uncovered in the ergodic distributions in Quah (1993b) : in the long run, there is a piling up of probability mass in the tails, and a thinning out in the middle.
From the discussion of Section 2 above, the usual cross-country growth regressions shed little light on the dynamics just described in the previous paragraph. Thus, the evidence on "convergence" that different researchers have uncovered do not really bear on our empirical conclusions. Instead, the empirical results here simply highlight the error in interpreting previous findings as having demonstrated convergence.
One important aspect that other researchers have been able to investigate with cross-section regressions, and that I have not here, is the influence of conditioning information: savings, schooling, political stability, and so on. Quah (1993a) , in a different but related setting as that used above, has studied the effects of conditioning information. That work concludes that much the same divergence and immobility results as obtained here remain, even after conditioning. them to get an idea of future tendencies. The time sample for estimation comprises only about 20 points, however, so that not very much of interest was precisely estimated. The exercise nevertheless did confirm the drift tendencies in the extreme quantiles.
IV. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to criticize standard cross-section regression tests of the convergence hypothesis. Section 2 did that, in some detail. By drawing an analogy of these regression tests with those of the classical Galton's fallacy, and then extending the reasoning for dynamics, I have shown why these cross-section tests are misleading for the hypothesis of interest.
The alternative, more direct tests described in this paper provide evidence against the convergence hypothesis. They show, instead, a world with economies tending-in the long run-towards either the very rich or very poor, with the middle-income classes vanishing. The rich-poor income disparity, in addition, appears to be widening.
What are the next steps in this alternative, empirical research program, one that escapes the strictures of the classical Galton's fallacy? First, the lessons here call for theoretical growth models that generate predictions for the dynamics of the entire cross-economy distribution, not just for those of a single economy. Second, there is scope for studying time-heterogeneity in these evolving distributions, in ways that are richer than simply breaks in trend or unit-root nonstationarity. (Quah (1992b) is a first step.) Third, many of the issues raised here extend naturally to empirical studies of regional and geographical dynamics and of the dynamics of large cross-sections of commodity and asset prices. Such investigations are currently under way. 
